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THE FUTURE OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
IN THE AFTERMATH OF
POLAND'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
Monika G. Kislowska*

INTRODUCTION
Poland, which became a Member State of the European Union ("EU")
on May 1, 2004, came a long way to accomplish its goal of membership in the
organization. The especially difficult accession process can be attributed to the
fact that during the last fifteen years, Poland was going through a challenging
transformation of its economic and political systems. During the early 1990s,
Poland moved from a centrally planned economy and communist government to
a market oriented economy and democratic government. This transformation
influenced the speed and effectiveness of the country's adjustment to the EU,
and drew attention to several areas in the Polish economy and political sphere
that needed to undergo extensive reform.
For purposes of accession to the EU, a number of areas in Poland's
economy underwent changes tailored to the specific EU requirements; among
them, State aid proved to be one of the most interesting and complicated to
adjust. State aid reform became especially important in light of the fact that this
discipline bears directly on competition policy. Competition constitutes an
integral part of the EU working mechanism because it ensures the proper
functioning of the EU Common Market.' In Poland, an extensive network of
Special Economic Zones ("SEZs") that constitute a key component of the
country's State aid policy added to the difficulty of adjusting this area of Polish
economy to the EU requirements. The SEZs were troubling because they were
based on legislation that in many aspects directly contradicted the EU State aid
guiding principles. The forms of State aid (preferential income and property tax

J.D. Candidate, 2007, Hofstra University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Mark
Movsesian for his insight and guidance. I would also like to thank my loving husband Konrad for
his unending patience, support and encouragement, and my friend Stefanie Hyder for her assistance
with editing of this Note.
1 See Europa: Gateway to the European Union,
http://www.europa.eu.int/polcomp/overview-en.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
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breaks) offered in the SEZs were perceived by the EU as a serious barrier to the
maintenance of the regime of fair competition in the integrated EU market.
Consequently, during the years preceding Poland's accession to the EU, the
original SEZs legislation was substantially reformed to meet the EU
requirements.
Currently, the Special Economic Zones are prospering very well after
their legislation was successfully adjusted to the EU norms; however, new
complications are on the horizon. The major problem that the SEZs will soon
face is that they are scheduled to cease to exist within the next ten to eleven
years. Given how dynamic and beneficial the most recent activity in the SEZs
has been to Poland's economy, the transition to a Poland without SEZs has the
potential of causing a serious crisis. Poland still remains well behind its EU
western counterparts in terms of standards of living and economic development,
and this situation may be seriously worsened by the liquidation of the SEZs.
One solution to the problem may be to allow for an extension of the lifetime of
the SEZs, or a creation of SEZs in the new regions of Poland. Since SEZs
legislation is no longer incompatible with the EU State aid principles, the fears
of SEZs becoming a barrier to the maintenance of fair competition in the
Common Market are no longer warranted. Moreover, given the most recent
disputes regarding the EU budget, SEZs may just become a key to resolving
those problems because they can help boost the development and bring
standards of living in Poland closer to those within the western EU Member
States.
This Note will attempt to analyze the impact of the EU accession
conditionality on State aid and SEZs structure in Poland. Section II of this Note
will briefly discuss the premises of the EU State aid policy, the changes that
occurred within this field in the last fifteen years, and its most current trends.
Section III will concentrate on the case study of Poland and will provide some
background information on the system of State aid as it existed in the country
prior to the EU accession negotiations. Section IV will discuss the SEZs, how
they came into existence and the specific changes that the SEZs legislation
underwent in order to become compatible with EU law. Finally, Section V will
discuss the future of the SEZs and propose solutions that the EU and Poland
could consider in order to make the transition from the SEZs less detrimental on
Poland's economy but at the same time satisfactory to the EU.
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THE BACKGROUND OF STATE AID IN THE EU.
In the EU, State aid is one of the five areas 2 that comprise the
organization's competition policy 3. Behind this simple phrase lies an elaborate
mechanism that the EU put in place to control a form of state intervention that
''
its individual Member States use to "promote a certain economic activity.
The intervention occurs when some economic sectors or activities are treated
more favorably than others. In such situations less efficient firms, which
receive State aid, are enabled to prosper at the expense of more efficient firms
which do not receive aid. 5 This is in sharp contrast to the scenario where
general economic measures are "equally applicable throughout the Member
State and are intended to favor the whole of the economy." 6 The EU accepts
these general measures and public subsidies because they have no affect on
trade and do not distort or threaten to distort competition.7 State aid measures,
on the other hand, are perceived by the EU as destructive to the proper
functioning of the Common Market8 and to the maintenance of fairness in the
competitive process among all the Member States; 9 hence, the EU's
commitment to their strict control.
Articles 87 to 89 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") provide the constitutional basis of State aid in the EU and set up
its institutional framework.' 0 Article 87(1) spells out the main premise of the
law, which is the prohibition of State aid which "distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain

2 The remaining four areas are Antitrust, Mergers, Liberalization and International. Europa:
Gateway to the European Union, Competition: Policy Areas,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
3 Since effective competition is the key to a proper functioning of an open market economy, the EU
devised a number of rules and regulations designed to ensure fair trade in goods and services by
businesses and government of Member States. See Europa: Gateway to the European Union,
http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/comp/overview-en.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
4 Report: State Aid Scoreboard 2005: Spring 2005 update, COM(05)147 final at 11, availableat
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/stateaid/scoreboard/2005/spring en.pdf [hereinafter
Scoreboard 2005].
5 See Stephen Martin & Paola Valbonesi, State aid in Context, in REGULATORY REFORM AND
COMPETITIVENESS INEUROPE 176 (Giampado Galli & Jacques Pelkmans eds., 2000), available at
http://www.ks.dk/publikationer/statsstoette/2000/workshop/smartinpaperl .pdf.
6 See Scoreboard 2005, supra note 4, at 11.
7 id.
8Id.
9 Id.
10Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 177.
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goods."' 1 The principle in this Article is a rather strict and broad prohibition.
Thus, to offset its potentially all encompassing reach, the EC Treaty created
mandatory and discretionary exceptions to the rule in Articles 87(2) and 87(3).12
These mandatory exceptions concern aid of a social character; aid designed to
combat damages caused by natural disasters and aid granted to certain areas of
the Federal Republic of Germany. 13 The discretionary exceptions encompass
such forms of assistance as aid to promote development of poor regions, the
execution of projects important to common European interests, culture and
heritage conservation, as well as, all aid that may be determined necessary by
the Council. 14 The main goal of the EU is to work for the good of its Member
States so the general ban on State aid is lifted when "the proposed aid schemes
may have a beneficial impact in overall Union terms."' 15
The European Commission ("Commission"), the only politically
independent body in the EU, plays the main role in monitoring and controlling
grants of State aid. 16 Its main job is "to uphold the interests of the EU as a
whole. 17 So to effectively ensure its integrity in this field, the Commission
does not take instructions from any Member States' government. Additionally,
as the EU's executive arm and the "Guardian of its Treaties," the Commission
ensures that regulations and directives adopted by the organization's legislative
bodies are executed. 18 In the realm of State aid, it has the exclusive authority to
review the various aid schemes proposed by the Member States' governments
and to determine whether they are compatible with the Common Market. The
Member States are obliged to give the Commission an advance notification of
their aid projects ("ex ante notification") and none of those projects can be
implemented until approved by the Commission (the so-called "standstill
principle"). 19 Consequently, any aid that is granted without the Commission's

" TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 67
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E-EN.pdf

[hereinafter EC TREATY].
12See Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 177.
13EC TREATY, supra note 11, at 33.
14 ld.

15Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Competition: State aid Overview,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state-aid/overview (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
16 See id.
17 Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Europe in 12 Lessons,

http://europa.eu.int/abc/121essons/index4_en.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
18 Id.
19Vademecum - Community Rules on State aid (last updated Sept. 1, 2003), at 7found at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/Vompetition/state-aid/others/vademecum/vademecumen2003-en.p
df [hereinafter Vademecum].
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approval is illegal, and the Commission has a duty to order recovery of such aid
which requires the public authorities in the Member State,
responsible for
20
granting of the aid, to seek a refund from the aid recipients.
The EU recognizes three broad types of State aid measures: horizontal,
regional and sectoral. 21 Horizontal aid deals with market failures which usually
entail some sort of externality (i.e. the social cost created by the business
activity but not reflected in business cost or revenue), and which affect firms
without regard to location or sector.2 2 The main objectives of this type of aid
are research and development, rescue and restructuring, employment,
environment and small and medium size enterprises.23 Regional aid is designed
to assist with the development of disadvantaged regions.24 Its main objectives
encompass aid to regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or
where there is serious unemployment as well as aid to regions which do not
meet the requirements of the first type of aid but which are still disadvantaged
in comparison to other regions of the EU.25 Finally, sectoral aid deals with aid
to the declining sectors, specifically coal, steel, shipbuilding and synthetic fibers
sectors, and to the sectors that may suffer because of difficulty adjusting to the
full forces of market competition, i.e. banking, air transport, shipping and motor
vehicle sectors.2 6 Planning, restructuring, minimizing harm to competitors and
reducing capacity are the key objectives of this last type of aid.27
In the years preceding the 1990s, few reports or analyses discussing
the trends in EU State aid levels were available. The situation began to change

20 Id. In 1998, the Commission decided to somewhat modernize and loosen its rules by designating

certain categories of State aid which would be automatically, without the need for notification and
approval, declared compatible with the Common Market if they meet a number of specific
requirements (so called "block exemption notifications").
21 See id. at 5-6.

22 Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 179.
23 Id at 180.
24 Id. at 179. Regional aid is covered by the Articles 87(3)(a) and 87(3)(c) of the EC treaty. Article
87(3)(a) applies to State aid to promote the development of areaswhere the standardof living is
abnormallylow or where there
is serious underemployment. Article 87(3)(a) targets regions that are disadvantaged compared to
the EU average. Article 87(3)(c) covers aid to other types of (national) problem regions "aid to
facilitate the development of certain economic areas. This Article gives Member States the
possibility to assist regions which are disadvantaged compared to the national average. See Ewa
Kaliszuk, Polityka Wspolnoty Europejskiej w Zakresie Pomocy Publicznej, 2 (125) Wspolnoty
Europejskie, 49, 50 (2002).
25 Kaliszuk, supranote 24, at 50.
26 Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 181.
27 See id.
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28
in 1993 when the EU experienced a peak in State aid grants by its Members.
A serious effort aimed at the lowering of State aid marked the following decade.
This was mainly realized through the tightening of State aid control, and
ensuring that only the aid that served the Common Market was granted.29
Various European Councils were convened that made the regulation of State aid
a priority on their agenda. Initially, at the Dublin European Council in 1996,
the EU Member States committed to the improvement of the effectiveness of
State aid control and to the reinforcement of the control mechanisms. 30 Later, at
the Cardiff European Council in 1998, the EU government concluded that
strategies needed "to be developed for an overall reduction in State aid.'
Next, at the Lisbon European Council in 2000, a commitment "to promote
competition" was reiterated and the Member States were called upon "to reduce
the general level of State aid and shift the emphasis from supporting individual
companies or sectors towards tackling horizontal objectives of common interest,
such as employment, regional development, environment and training or
research. 3 2 Finally, at the Stockholm European Council in 2001, the Member
States were asked to "demonstrate a downward trend in State aid in relation to
the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") by 2003, taking into account the need to
redirect aid towards horizontal objectives of common interest, including
cohesion objectives." 33 The Commission, also aware of the need for the
reduction in the volume of State aid, asked the EU governments to "make
34
additional efforts to avoid sector specific and especially ad hoc State aid.,
The effectiveness of the European Councils' recommendations and of
the Commission's measures designed to increase the transparency of the aid
granting process is best illustrated by the downward trend in the overall EU
State aid granted in the end of the 1990s. Initially, sectoral aid constituted the
most prevalent type of aid in the EU with the aid to the manufacturing sector
amounting to 4% of the value added of the twelve Member States in 1990." 5
But by the end of the 1990s, the Member States had already shifted a significant
percentage of the aid that was earlier assigned to the specific manufacturing,

28Commission of the European Communities Report: State aid Scoreboard 2001, COM(01)412
final at 12, available at http://europa.eu.int/dur-lex/en/con/cnc/2001/com2OOl_O412en0l.pdf
[hereinafter Scoreboard 2001].
29 See id. at 6.

30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.

35 Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 182.
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coal and service sectors to assist with horizontal objectives. 36 As a result, in
1997, State aid to the manufacturing sector in the EU amounted to only 2.5% of
the value added of the fifteen Member States.37 These changes, although at first
seemingly nominal, soon became the starting point for the fulfillment of the
Lisbon Agenda of 2000 which was implemented to help shift the EU State's aid
emphasis from supporting individual companies or sectors to assisting with the
horizontal objectives of the Community. 38 This transformation was important
because although these horizontal objectives still counted as State aid, they
were substantially more in accordance with the common interests of the EU
than the previously offered forms of aid. This was mainly because they had
"the potential to create benefits
that were greater than their cost measured in
39
terms of aid amounts alone."
The most recent findings show that the percentage of State aid granted
to specific sectors has steadily decreased in favor of State aid committed to
achieve horizontal objectives. The share of horizontal aid had risen to 79% of
total aid 40 as compared to 50% in the mid- 1990s. 41 Sectoral aid, which includes42
aid to rescue and restructure failing firms, now contributes 21% of all aid.
Table One shows a detailed breakdown of each type of aid by its
subcomponents and by the individual Member States.
Some skeptics of the EU might argue that other economic reasons,
other than EU policy, led to these structural changes in State aid. All the
available data, however, seems to suggest that these changes were mainly the
result of the reforms undertaken by the EU. The data seems to be even more
credible when one considers the fact that it not only discusses the resolutions
that were met, but also those that were not fully realized. For example, the
situation in EU Member Sates regarding the level of State aid in relation to the
GDP seemed much less encouraging. The trend in this area remained steady
rather than downward, although the idea of lowering the ratio of State aid to the
GDP was one of the main commitments of the most recent Stockholm European
Council.43 The overall volume of aid decreased from the high levels that

36

See Scoreboard 2001, supra note 28, at 13.

37 Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 182.
38 Scoreboard 2005, supra note 4, at 4.
39 Scoreboard 2001, supra note 28, at 13.
40 Total State aid as defined by the Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty covers manufacturing, services,

coal,
agriculture, fisheries and transport sectors, but not the railway sector.
41 Scoreboard 2005, supra note 4, at 5.
42

See id.

41 Id. at 14.

180
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existed in the early and mid-1990s; however, from 1999-2003, it remained the
same, amounting to 0.57% of the EU GDP in 2003, compared to 0.63% in 1999
and 1.09% in 1992. 44 Expressed in absolute terms, the total aid granted by the
fifteen EU Member States was estimated at45 €53 billion in 2003, compared to
€74 billion in 1996 and €55 billion in 1999.
Since State aid can take different forms, the EU Member States have a
number of different instruments at their disposal when assigning aid, including
grants, tax exemptions, soft loans, tax deferrals and guarantees. 46 During 20012003, the share of each aid instrument in the EU Member States' aid to the
manufacturing and service sectors was as follows: grants accounted for 67% of
the total State aid, tax exemptions for 22.7%, soft loans for 4.8%, tax deferrals
for 2.6%, guarantees for 2.2% and equity participation for 0.7%. 47 Most
recently, the use of tax exemptions as a form of aid decreased in favor of grants.
For example, the grant aid rose from 48% in the years 1992-94, to 57% in the
years 1995-97 and 67% in 2003. At the same time, tax exemptions decreased in
those periods from 26% in the years 1992-94 and 24% in the years 1995-97 to
22.7% in 2003.48 These changes were attributed to the fact that grants are more
easily adopted by governments than tax exemptions because they do not require
as many changes in the law.49
In sum, since the late 1990s the EU perceived the control and
monitoring of State aid as extremely important to the proper functioning of the
Common Market, with all Member States fairly participating in the exchange
and competitive process occurring within the organization. In light of these
conclusions, it is clear why this area of EU policy has become especially
controversial during the organization's enlargement process and why the
organization strived so hard to ensure that there existed uniformity in the
legislation of each new Member State and the EU body of law called the
"acquis communautaire." Allowing any country to become an EU Member
State without first making sure that its laws were compatible with those of the
EU could seriously undermine all of the efforts the EU had put into
administering State aid among the existing Member States and preventing
distortions that threatened to take over the Common Market. Since, in the past,
Poland implemented State aid regulations that differed greatly from that of the

"See id.
43 Id. at 4.
4

See Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5,at 185, 187.

47 See Scoreboard 2005, supra note 4, at 27.
48 Martin & Valbonesi, supra note 5, at 185.
49 id.
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EU, it is understandable why the adjustment of this area of the economy became
crucial to the success of the accession negotiations between Poland and the EU.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF STATE AID IN
POLAND.
In light of the information provided in the preceding section, it
becomes clear that a background introduction to the structure of State aid in
Poland is essential to better understand the nature of the problems that State aid
and the SEZs posed during the EU accession process. Accordingly, this section
of the Note will discuss State aid as it existed in Poland in the beginning of the
1990s and the changes that this area of the Polish economy underwent to
become compatible with the EU legal norms.
i. State Aid in Poland in the early 1990s.
Prior to the 1990s, Poland was a communist country with a centrally
planned economy, and as a result, the concept of State aid did not exist there
during that time.5 ° Instead, under the centrally planned economy, the
government played a major role in controlling all aspects of economic
organization through the direct intervention in the affairs of the enterprise
sector.51 The government used subsidies to link the state budget and the
quantitative plans.52 These plans were the main tool for controlling enterprises
because they dictated "what kind of goods and services, how much, and when
and where to produce." 53 The government was responsible for setting the
"socially desirable" prices, which were basically prices that created an illusion
of serving society but that in no realistic way corresponded to the true cost of
goods and services. 54 When the time for transformation came, the government
was forced to abandon its control system and allow for the establishment of
appropriate institutions that would help in the development of the private

50 Marcin Sowa, State aid and government policy in Poland, 1994-2002, at 3, CASE, Nov. 15,

2003, http://www.case.com.pl/dyn/plik--2100442.pdf.
5'Iraj Hashi, Ewa Balcerowicz, Marcin Sowa, Mikolos Szanyi & Marie Bohata, The Comparative
Analysis of State aid and Government Policy in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Int'l J.
Econ. Research (forthcoming) Center for Social and Economic Research, at 2.
52 Report: State aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2004 update, COM (04)750 final at 11, availableat
http://europa.eu.int/commi/competition/stateaid/scoreboard/2004/autumn-en.pdf [hereinafter
Scoreboard 2004].
53id.
54Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND POLAND'S ACCESSION TO THE

EU

sector.5 This was mainly done through the reduction of subsidies and a
movement towards
liberalization of prices which finally began to reflect real
56
market levels.
These changes were of an unprecedented scale and, not surprisingly,
they quickly led to disturbance in the economy. Many enterprises, unable to
withstand the new conditions, fell into financial trouble. To help businesses
survive, the government intervened by providing firms with financial support. 7
In 1991, in an effort to save some of the hardest hit industries, the government
established the Industry Development Agency ("IDA"), which became
responsible for promoting industrial efficiency and assisting in restructuring. 8
From 199 1-1996, the IDA played the main role in restructuring Ursus, Poland's
largest tractor manufacturer, and the Polish National Railways. 9
In the initial stages of this economic transformation, the government
and its agencies set up State aid programs as they wished. Such freedom in
structuring led to a situation where the majority of State aid granted in Poland in
the early 1990s was not connected to any long-term policy but was ad hoc and
unfocused.60 Aid programs turned out to be direct support payments to the
failing state-owned enterprises, which in many cases collapsed before they
could even have a chance to restructure and become more efficient.
Poland's decision to apply for membership in the EU curtailed, to a
certain degree, this process of uncontrolled governmental assistance. In fact, in
1994, a new era began for the country when it signed the European Agreement
("EA"). 6 The EA provided a framework for trade and related matters between
the EU and Poland,62 and called for Poland to respect the boundaries set by the
EU State aid rules. "The existence of a functioning market economy and the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU, 63
were among the most important requirements for joining of the EU. The
fulfillment of those requirements was largely dependent upon the tight control
of each Member State's State aid policy. Accordingly, because large

55Hashi, supra note 51, at 2.
56

Scoreboard 2004, supranote 48, at 11.

57 id.

58Sowa, supra note 50, at 4.
'9 Id. at 5.
6 Id.

61Poland became a signatory to the EA in 1991 and the Agreement went into effect in early 1994.
See Strefy Kompromisu, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Apr. 5, 2002, at 24.
62Scoreboard 2004, supranote 48, at 13.
63 id.
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discrepancies existed between the EU and the Polish structure of State aid, from
the very beginning, the EU stressed the need for adjustment in this area.64
Thus, beginning with the EA, the organization began to specify which
forms of Polish State aid it considered incompatible with the well functioning
market economy. The policy outlined in Article 63.1 of the EA states, in
relevant part: "The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of
the Agreement, insofar as they may affect trade between the Community and
Poland: ...... (iii) any public aid which distorts and threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods. 65 The EU argued that successful closure of negotiations in this area
depended on the fulfillment of the following three requirements: (1) the
alignment of Polish competition law with that of the acquis communataire, (2)
the creation of state monitoring agencies responsible for controlling the
compatibility of State aid measures with66 the EU law, and (3) the practical
application of the adopted EU regulations.
Poland had considerably little trouble with a timely fulfillment of the
second requirement. Starting in 1998, it had a functioning state monitoring
agency, the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection ("UOKIK") 67,
responsible for reviewing State aid granting measures. The situation was much
more troublesome with respect to the timely achievement of the first and third
requirements. Although, theoretically, it made a lot of sense for the EU to
request from all its future candidate countries to start implementing the
necessary reforms early; in practice, because the EU had not prescribed specific
legal rules that would enable Poland to implement the guiding principles of the
68
acquis communautaire, the real progress in this area was initially very slow.
In fact, the country did not begin to implement significant textual and practical
changes to its State aid laws until the year 2000.69 Some experts had explained
this situation by pointing to the fact that the EA, while prescribing certain rules

64Hashi, supranote 51, at 10.
65 1993 0. J. (L 348) 2, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg-en&numdoc
-21993A 1231(18)&model=guichett.
66Kaliszuk, supra note 24, at 53.
67 "UOKIK" is the Polish acronym for "Urzad Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentow" which
translates to "Office for Competition and Consumer Protection."
68 See Adam A. Ambroziak, Rozwiazanie Kwestii Udzielania Pomocy Publicznej w Specjalnych
Strefach Economicznych w PoIsce (I), 2 (137) Wspolnoty Europejskie 2003 16, 25 (2003)
[hereinafter Ambroziak I].
69See Sowa, supra note 50, at 7-10; Adam Szymaniak, Problem Specjalnych StrefEkonomicznych
w NegocjacjachPolski o Czlonkostwo w Unii Europejskiej, 9 (132) Wspolnoty Europejskie 15, 17
(2002).
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to follow, did not have an implementing mechanism. 70 As a result, Poland did
not feel as if it was truly obliged to follow the EU law. This phenomenon, as
well as the fact that the EA was new legislation, provide a good explanation for
why the SEZs created in Poland by the legislative act of December 24, 1994
have since proved to be so incompatible with the EU State aid law.
ii.

Changes in the State Aid structure in Poland resulting from
the country's negotiations for membership in the EU.

State aid reforms took on a different character when the full-fledged
accession negotiations opened in 1998 and the EU accession authorities more
closely evaluated the level of Poland's compliance with the EU State aid
norms. 7 1 At that time it was discovered, contrary to the Commission's
expectations, that Poland had not been very effective in adapting the EU
regulations. Poland had specifically failed to do away with certain fiscal
72
measures, such as various tax preferences offered to investors in the SEZs,
which were most in conflict with the EU State aid and regional policy.
Consequently, because the EU was not satisfied with the situation in Poland, it
began to condition Poland's accession to the 73organization on a successful
implementation of all required State aid reforms.
In order to fulfill the EU's accession requirements outlined above and
become eligible for accession to the EU, starting with the year 2000, Poland
finally began to make some long awaited changes to its State aid policy. First,
on June 30, 2000, the Polish legislature adopted the Act on the admissibility and
supervision of State aid for entrepreneurs, called the State Aid Act of 2000
("SAA"). 7 4 The SAA, encompassing twelve ordinances and regulations,
provided for a general prohibition on the grants of State aid, with exceptions for
a few, limited circumstances of so called admissible types of aid. Those
admissible types of aid consisted of aid for horizontal, regional and sectoral
objectives.75 The SAA also introduced the "de minimis" rule which allowed for
all aid cases below C100,000 over three consecutive years to be exempted from
all but reporting obligations. 76 In the fall of 2000, Poland also passed revised

70 See Ambroziak I, supra note 68, at 24; see Strefy Kompromisu, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Apr. 5,

2002, at 24.
71 Scoreboard 2004, supranote 48, at 13.
72Kaliszuk, supra note 24, at 53.
71

Id. at 50.

74 Sowa, supranote 50, at 7.
71 Id. at 8.
76

Id. at 9.
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legislation regarding the
SEZs, which was aimed at adopting the EU State aid
77
norms into Polish law.
Accordingly, where identified State aid measures were deemed to be
incompatible with the EU acquis, Poland was required either to abolish them or
align them with the EU norms. In some rare cases, consultations between
Poland and the EU resulted in special transitory arrangements, which were
strictly limited in scope and duration. 78 In the end, the negotiations regarding
the adjustment of the competition policy were eventually concluded at the
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 and the Treaty of Accession
was signed in Athens in April 2003. 79 Poland entered into transitory
agreements regarding the restructuring of the steel industry, the grants of State
aid for environmental protection and the grants of fiscal aid in the SEZs. The
final review and adjustment of State aid schemes is still underway in the
framework of the existing aid procedures.8 °
iii. 1995-2003 State Aid trends in Poland.
During the period 1996-2002, the volume of State aid in Poland
viewed as the share of GDP decreased significantly from 2.6% in 1996 to 1.3%
in 2002.81 With respect to the types of State aid granted, subsidies and fiscal
operations, followed by soft credits became the most prevalent forms of aid
offered.82 Operations in equity were very minimal and so were credit
warranties, although the latter showed a tendency to increase by 2000.83 For the
most part, State aid during those years was financed through the reduction in
budgetary revenues. 84 The year 2000 was an exception when the direct
expenditures and reductions in budgetary revenues equally contributed to the
financing of State aid.85 This pattern of aid structure differs significantly from
the EU pattem where subsidies prevail. In the EU, more than 60% of aid is
transferred to enterprises in the form of subsidies, and tax exemptions account
for about 25% of aid, while soft credit for about 6%.86

77 Id.

78 Kaliszuk, supra note 24, at 53.
79 Scoreboard 2004, supra note 48, at 14.
go Id. at 16.
81 See Sowa, supra note 50, at 14.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 15.

4 Id.
85 Id.
86 id.
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With respect to Polish State aid objectives, 33% of the aid in 2002
went to horizontal objectives, 18% to sensitive sectors and about 5% was
appropriated to regional aid.87 Table Two provides a more detailed description
of State aid in Poland categorized by aid objectives. The structure of Polish
State aid by aid objective is different from that of the EU where almost half of
State aid is put toward horizontal objectives and about one quarter of aid is
regional. 88 The post-transition character of the Polish economy, with more
support directed at the sensitive sectors, as well as the pressure from the
sensitive sector groups are the two factors responsible for this difference. 89 In
the years after Poland's entrance into the EU, this dynamic has begun to change
noticeably and Poland's State aid structure has gradually begun to look more
like that of the EU. This state of affairs is mainly due to the successful
alignment of Polish law with that of the EU, especially in the area of SEZs
legislation, and to the Commission taking a more direct and active role in
controlling and monitoring of the grants of State aid in Poland. 90
THE SEZS: ONE OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
IN THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS.

i. The creation of the SEZs.
The SEZs were first created in Poland pursuant to legislation passed on
October 20, 1994, which was subsequently amended by the statutes adopted on
November 16, 2000 and October 3, 2003. 9 1 They served as an important tool in
the government's struggle for the successful adaptation of the country's
economy to the stringent requirements of the free market system. Accordingly,
some viewed the SEZs as special, privileged economic enclaves within which
the government decided to either limit its rights or grant special preferences in
order to achieve some specified economic or social goals. 92 In general, the

87

Id. at 17.

88 Id.
89 Id. at 18.

90 Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Pracy [Ministry of Economy and Labor), Raport: Specjalne Strefy
Economiczne stan na dzien 31 grudnia 2004 r. [Report regardingthe condition of the Special
Economic Zones as of Dec. 31, 2004] Warsaw, March 2005, at 29-31,
http://www.mgip.gov.p/NR/rdonlyres/F4B564A9-97C7-49D9-9FC366FA65F9E7B0/1 031 1/RaportSSE2032005.doc [hereinafter Ministry Report].
91 Szymaniak, supra note 69, at 15.
92 id.
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SEZs were designed to help revive the economy by attracting new foreign
capital to the country. 93 The main idea behind their creation was the desire to
fight structural unemployment in selected regions of Poland.94 This goal was
accomplished by directing new investment into the SEZs. The SEZs appeared
to be especially attractive to investors because they offered a number of fiscal
advantages that other regions of the country did not possess. 95
In accordance with the terms of the 1994 statute, the SEZs were
created for a period of twenty years in isolated, uninhabited parts of the
country's selected regions. 96 The aspect of the zones most responsible for
encouraging investors to locate their firms there was the unique system of fiscal
incentives. Pursuant to Article 12 of the 1994 statute, investors in the SEZs
could choose among the following fiscal incentives: (1) a complete exemption
from the income tax for the first 10 years of the investor's activity in the zones,
(2) a 50% exemption from the income tax payment for the remaining years of
investor's economic activity, until the zones cease to exist, (3) a possibility of
including expenses that are not related to the purchase of permanent means of
the business development in the costs of the investment and (4) a possibility of
increase in the amortization rates of the permanent means used in the business
pursued in the zones.97 The last two incentives constituted tax preferences
available for those investors that did not qualify for exemptions specified in the
first two incentives. They allowed investors to lower their
tax base in a
98
preferential way and consequently to pay lower income taxes.
The Board of Ministers was responsible for setting the conditions
under which an investor in the SEZs was entitled to either a 100% or a 50%
exemption from the income tax. 99 They included the following: (1) the creation
and maintenance, for a specified period of time, of a certain number of new
employment positions linked to the investor's activity in a zone, (2) the creation
of a permanent production investment in a zone with a value exceeding a certain
specified amount, (3) the achievement and maintenance, for a specified period
of time, of a certain minimal level of income from the goods produced or
services offered in a zone, and (4) the achievement and maintenance, for a

93 id.
94 See Ministry Report, supra note 90, at 2.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Dz.U. z 1994 r. Nr 123, poz. 600, availableat http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc2/ustawy/582 u.htm.

See Adam. A. Ambroziak, Funkcjonowanie Specjalncych Stref Ekonomicznych po Akcesji Polski
to UE, 4/5 (150) Wspolnoty Europejskie 43,43 (2004) [hereinafter Ambroziak].
99 See Article 12 § 5. Dz.U. z 1994 r. Nr 123, poz. 600, available at
http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc2/ustawy/582_u.htm.
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specified period of time, of a certain minimal level of income from export of the
goods produced or services offered in a zone.100 It is worth noting that because
at that time the tax rates in the country were quite high, such complete
exemptions presented a valuable advantage to those who decided to invest in
the SEZs. 011 In addition to the above outlined income tax incentives, investors
in the SEZs could also take advantage of various exemptions and preferential
treatments offered by local governments; the most important was a complete
exemption from property taxes. 102
Besides the quite advantageous specific tax incentives, the SEZs 1994
statute also included two other points that made investment in the SEZs even
more attractive. First, as indicated in Article 13 of the 1994 statute, all
exemptions and preferences outlined above could not have been taken away or
deteriorated during the period for which the SEZs were created. 0 3 Second, the°4
1994 statute did not specify any limits on these preferential treatments.1
These regulations were extremely advantageous to the SEZs investors because
they provided them with an additional layer of assurance regarding the tax
breaks that they were to obtain once they fulfilled the requirements for
investment in the SEZs. At the same time, because these provisions were
clearly in conflict with the EU's guiding principles on State aid, they
soon
05
became the main obstacles to the EU's acceptance of SEZs legislation.,
ii. Difficulties with SEZs in the face of Poland's negotiations for
EU admission.
The initial results following the creation of the SEZs were very
optimistic. From 1994-1998, seventeen SEZs were created in Poland and the
investors that were active in them already declared their willingness to invest
over 3.9 billion zloty (approx. $1.3 billion)10 6 and create about 12,000 new
jobs. 10 7 However, the problems began in March 1998 when Poland
began to
08
negotiate with the EU regarding its membership in the organization.

1ooSee Article 12, § 6. Id.
101Ambroziak, supra note 98, at 44.
102id.
103id.
'0o Konrad Niklewicz, Wyjscie ze specjalnejstrefy, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Feb. 8, 2002, at 26.
105Id.
'06 Zloty is the Polish currency. One dollar equals approximately three zloty.

107Niklewicz, supra note 104, at 26.
108 Id.
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The alignment of a candidate country's legal norms with that of the EU
has always been one of the main requirements of EU membership. Since, it was
clear early on in the negotiation process that the rules governing the
establishment and working of the SEZs in Poland were in conflict with the EU
competition norms, Poland knew that they needed revision. The lack of limits
on State aid offered in the SEZs was especially problematic since the EU law
clearly states that State aid cannot exceed 50% of the cost of the investment for
large firms and 65% of the cost of investment for small and medium
enterprises. 0 9 At the time, the firms that were investing in Polish SEZs had
already or would have in the near future exceeded these limits. Based on the
EU's objection to SEZs legislation, in February 1999 Poland agreed to amend
the SEZs law and those modifications went into effect on January 1, 2001.10
The revised SEZs statute harmonized Polish SEZs law with the acquis
communautaire, although it applied only to those investing in the SEZs after
December 31, 2000.111 The new law did not apply to business that became
active in the SEZs before the year 2001, because Article 13 of the SEZs
founding statute protected against deterioration in the acquired rights of all
those who started their business activity under the old SEZs rules."t 2 The 2001
modification was mainly concerned with setting caps on the aid which before
was virtually limitless. Accordingly, the businesses investing in the SEZs after
December 31, 2000, needed to comply with a number of factors, set separately
for each zone, in order to qualify for any type of exemption. 1 3 This meant that
they were no longer automatically relieved of the 100% income tax for the first
ten years of operations and 50% for the following ten years. The exemptions
were now calculated separately for each SEZ but, in any case, they were not to
exceed 50% of the cost of investment for a large company, and 65% for a small
or medium enterprise." 14
The EU accepted this new SEZ law as being compatible with the
acquis communautaire; however, the organization was still unsatisfied with the
solutions Poland proposed regarding the firms that had invested in the SEZs
before 2001.115 The pre-2001 investors were allowed to keep all of their tax

109 Id.
110

Id.

. See Ambroziak, supra note 98, at 44.

id.
P. Pogodzinski, Od Nowego Roku Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne PrzestajaByc Rajami
Podatkowymi, Lex-Press, Oct. 15, 2000,
http://www.lexpress.pl/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=40 (April 6, 2006).
114 Id.
115 Niklewicz, supra note 104, at 26.
112
"13
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breaks and this was unacceptable to the EU. In search of a compromise, Poland
asked for a thirteen-year long transition period for the pre-2001 investors that
would allow them to keep the rights that they had been granted by virtue of the
1994 SEZs legislation."1 6 The EU did not agree, arguing that Poland should
have known from the time when the SEZs were first created that the original
law establishing them was in violation of the EU rules spelled out in the 1994
EA. ' 7 The EU was referring to Article 63 of the EA which states, in relevant
part, that "any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods" is
incompatible with the agreement.1 18 According to the EU's interpretation of this
Article, the rights that investors obtained as result of the 1994 SEZs legislation
was prohibited because the law was originally enacted in violation of the EU
rules. Poland did not agree with that interpretation of this EA provision. The
country viewed the Article 63 clause as inapplicable to the 1994 SEZs
legislation because at the time the EA lacked implementing rules. 19 In other
words, there were no substantive and procedural rules that allowed
incorporation of Article 63 into the Polish competition law as it existed at the
time. There was clearly a disagreement as to the interpretation of
the EA and
20
no side was willing to accept its opponent's view of the situation.'
In the end, Poland was faced with several options for resolving this
controversial issue: (1) it could arbitrarily take away the rights of investors; (2)
it could negotiate with investors and ask them to give up their rights in
exchange for reimbursements from the government; (3) the government and the
Parliament could decide to radically lower the income tax and get away with
SEZs all together (this is what Ireland did in 1970s when it also had a SEZs
problem, or (4) the government could initiate strict fiscal controls of all the
investors in the SEZs. 2' The Polish government was quite reluctant to proceed
with any of these solutions because each of them offered some negative
consequences.1 22 The first option, if adopted, could lead to a flood of lawsuits

116 id.

117Strefy Kompromisu, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Apr. 5, 2002, at 24.
18 1993 0. J. (L 348) 2, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc
=21993A1231(18)&model=guichett.
19 Strefy Kompromisu, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Apr. 5, 2002, at 24.
120 id.
121 See Niklewicz, supra note 104, at 26.

All the SEZs laws implemented before 2001 had a

provision that stated that a firm investing in a zone would lose all of its privileges if it was found
that it had its fiscal obligation in any amount exceeding 3% of total obligation. Most likely all the
firms in SEZs would have been found to break the law.
122 Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/7

18

Kislowska: The Future of Special Economic Zones in the Aftermath of Poland's

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW
against the government and could undermine the country's credibility vis-a-vis
the future foreign investors.12 3 The second option could also turn out to be quite
problematic because it presented the SEZs firms with difficulty calculating the
124
reduction they were to possibly receive had they not accepted the new law.
With respect to the third option, it was doubtful that the country could afford
such a maneuver.12 5 Finally, the fourth solution could potentially have the most
negative, long-run consequences because initiating stricter fiscal controls could
send a signal to prospective
SEZs firms that the country was doing so to destroy
26
all private business. 1
Eventually, Poland and the EU found a compromise which led to the
official closing of accession negotiations in the competition policy chapter in
December of 2002.127 In general, the new legislation divides the pre-2001
investors into three separate groups and assigns them different rights. First,
small and medium enterprises are allowed to keep the rights gained under the
1994 legislation until the end of 2011 and 2010.128 Second, large investors are
allowed to receive State aid in the amount of 75% of the cost of investment for
those who entered the SEZs in 1999 and 50% for those who entered the SEZs in
2000.129 Finally, investors from the motor vehicle sector are allowed to 1receive
30
State aid amounting to no more than 30% of the cost of their investment.
iv. Current trends in the SEZs as reported at the end of Year 2004.
Currently, there are fourteen SEZs operating in Poland:
Kamieniogorska, Katowicka, Kostrzynsko-Slubicka, Krakowska, Legnicka,
Lodzka, Mielecka, Pomorska, Slupska, Starachowiecka,
Suwalska,
Tarnobrzeska, Walbrzyska and Warminsko-Mazurska. 131 They encompass 429
enterprises, which have so far invested almost 20 billion zloty (approx. $6.6
billion) and employed 77,600 people. 32 The SEZs differ based on area,

123id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.

127A. Ambroziak, Rozwiazanie Kwestii Udzielania Pomocy Publicznej w Specjalnych Strefach
Economicznych w PoIsce (I), 3 (138) Wspolnoty Europejskie 37, 38-42 (2003) [hereinafter
Ambroziak II].
128 Ministry Report, supra note 90, at 4.
129Id.
130Id.
131 See Ministry Report, supra note 90, at 8.
132See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

19

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND POLAND'S ACCESSION TO THE EU
location, investment character and infrastructure. The Katowicka zone is the
largest, covering 1120 hectares, whereas the Cracow Technological Park is the
smallest with an area of roughly 122 hectares,' 33 Originally, the total SEZs area
was not to be increased beyond the territory that it covered as of December 31,
2000. However, due to the increased interest in the possibility of investment in
the SEZs, as of May 31, 2004, a new provision was added to the SEZs
legislation that now allows for increases in the SEZs area by approximately
1675 hectares, provided that the new area is used for investment
of at least €40
34
million or one that creates 500 and more new job posts.
The first permit allowing investment in the SEZs was issued in the
Mielecka Zone in 1996.135 Applications for permits increased each year for the
following four years, reaching a climax in 2000. The year 2000 witnessed the
most drastic increase in applications filed, mainly due to the anticipated changes
in the SEZs law that were to limit the tax incentives offered. 136 Following the
implementation of the 2000 reform in the SEZs legislation, which was
unfavorable for most investors' 37 the number of new permits issued fell in the
years 2001-2003. There were 250 valid permits in the SEZs by December 31,
1999, 725 by December 31, 2000, 703 by December 31, 2001, 690 by
December 31, 2002, and 670 by December 2003.38 Then, in 2004, as the SEZs
law stabilized, the situation began to improve. Many new firms began to
invest
39
in the SEZs, and by December 31, 2004 valid permits increased to 679.
The number of new job posts created in the SEZs increased in the
years 2001-2003 by about 20% a year. 40 The business activity in the
Katowicka and Milecka zones added the highest number of new job posts,
whereas the Slupska zone witnessed the smallest change in its employment
level.' 41 With respect to the investment dynamic, there has been a visible
increase in investment activity in 2004. Based on a two year analysis, the
Kostrzynsko-Slubicka zone experienced an increase of over 600% in investment
development in the year 2003 as compared to 2002.142 There were also
133 See id. at 9-10.
131 Id.
135
136
137

at 9.
Id. at 13.
id.
Id. at 9. In its negotiations with the EU, Poland was unable to keep the acquired rights of

investors unchanged, and as a result many new investors which applied for permits in 2000 never
began their investments and consequently their permits were taken back.
' See id. at 13.
139 See

id.

140Id. at 16.
141

Id.

142

See id. at 15.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/7

20

Kislowska: The Future of Special Economic Zones in the Aftermath of Poland's

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW
relatively high increases in investment in the Kammiennogorska zone- 208%,
the Warminsko-Mazurska zone - 171%, and the Lodzka zone - 167%. 141 It is
important, however, to keep in mind that it is quite difficult to expect the same
level of development in all SEZs because the inflow of investors into each zone
is different. It is enough to have one big new investment for the investment
dynamic to immediately increase.
The business activity in SEZs not only has a positive effect on the
economy of the country as a whole but also plays an important role on the local
level by benefiting the areas directly surrounding each SEZ. The increase in
investment in SEZs is often accompanied by a considerable increase in
employment in construction firms, as well as in firms providing other types of
services such as transport, education, finance and culture. 144 Generally, it is
estimated that 100 new job posts created in
the SEZs generate 50-100 new job
1 45
posts in the regions surrounding the SEZs.
In sum, SEZs are very beneficial to the country because most of all
they are a great tool for attracting new investments. Although the EU does not
look favorably on State aid granted in the forms of fiscal relief; this type of aid
makes the most sense from the point of view of the country's budget, especially
when taking under consideration the certainty of effects that SEZs bring with
them. 146 In the case of direct subsidies, there is no assurance that the investment
will be realized; in SEZs, on the other hand, an investor only gets exemptions if
he actually
goes through with his investment, begins production and cams
47
income.1
THE FUTURE OF SEZS IN POLAND.
As illustrated by the preceding discussion and analysis, the legal
structure of SEZs in Poland has undergone many significant changes due to the
country's accession to the EU and the accompanying alignment of the country's
law with the acquis communautaire. The negotiation process which lasted for
over four years and was characterized by many heated debates and strenuous
compromises attests to the degree of difficulty these reforms presented for both
Poland and the EU.1 48 The Polish government feared that the country as a
whole would be seriously undermined in the eyes of foreign investors if it was

143

'44
145

id.
Id. at 23.
id.

146 Id. at

30,

141 Id. at 31.
148 Ambroziak II, supra note 127, at 38-42.
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to retrospectively change the law under which investors came to participate in
the SEZs. As a result, Poland tried to negotiate transition periods for those
investing in the SEZs before 2001 and in defense of its position, it argued that
the old State aid regime would not have a negative impact on the competition in
the Common Market and the trade between Poland and other EU Member
States. 149 On the other hand, the EU did not believe that State aid offered in the
SEZs under the 1994 legislation was that harmless, especially in the context of
large investors and insisted on an immediate modification of the Polish law to
reflect the acquis communautaire.150 Eventually a compromise was reached and
Poland moved one step closer in its goal of accession to the EU.
Although the negotiations regarding the SEZs reform were
successfully finalized, the early phases of the implementation of the new SEZs
legislation brought a great deal of fear and doubt regarding the future success of
the SEZs. The investor activity in the SEZs experienced a significant slow
down in the years 2002-2003 when almost no new investors came into the SEZs
and when a number of investors who were previously awarded permits to
develop in the SEZs decided not to proceed because their rights acquired under
the old law had changed. 15 1 Eventually the new SEZs legislation had not
proven to be as destructive to the development of the SEZs as was initially
thought. In fact, the past couple of years have shown that the fears and
pessimism regarding the future effectiveness of the SEZs have not been
realized. New investors entering into the SEZs have come to terms with the
new SEZs legislation. The best proof of such attitude is the fact that investors
still find the SEZs attractive, although the privileges offered in the SEZs for
those investing there after January 1, 2002 are considerably lesser than before.
What is most important is that the new rules are compatible with the acquis
communautaire and certainly that they will not be taken away by the EU based
on their unlawfulness. As a result, the SEZs system is more transparent and
stable allowing those who would like to invest to work out their business plans
and stay assured that no negative surprises will occur in the future.
After the initial slow down period in the SEZs, there was a
considerable awakening in 2004 and 2005. Starting with the year 2004, many
new firms invested in the SEZs and the year 2005 experienced a record number
of new investors.' 52 In 2004, two SEZs issued more than ten new permits, and
starting with 2005 more than five SEZs have done so, with the Katowicka zone

141 Id. at
IS0

41.

Id. at 43.

Ministry Report, supra note 90, at 13-14.
152Malgorzata Grzegorczyk, Wszystko rosniejak na drozdzach, Puls Biznesu, Feb. 1,2006.
151

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/7

22

Kislowska: The Future of Special Economic Zones in the Aftermath of Poland's

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW
issuing more than thirty permits. 153 The investors in the Walbrzyska zone and
Warminsko-Mazurska zone have already promised to expend capital
investments worth more than one billion zloty (approx. $333 million) and in the
Kostrzynsk-Slubicka zone the investors foresee creating up to 5800 new job
posts.154 In the Lodzka zone, a record number of entrepreneurs began their
investment activity by opening fourteen new factories. 155 Nine out of the
fourteen SEZs have enlarged their area: the Krakowska zone nearly doubled its
area to 260 hectares, the Kostrzynsko-Slubicka zone grew from 540 to 804
hectares and the Tamobrzeska zone expanded from 810 to 1105 hectares.
These latest statistics are the best indicators of the beneficial effects that the
SEZs exert on several regions in the country. The activity in the SEZs has
lessened unemployment in Poland and the SEZs have also played a crucial role
in making use of foreign investment which is the key to gaining new
technological advances, which 56in turn help to ensure the competitiveness of the
country's firms and economy.'
In sum, in the past two years, many positive changes occurred in the
Special Economic Zones which have contributed to the increased activity.
There is, however, a serious problem concerning SEZs in the future. This
problem concerns the SEZs running out of room to accommodate new
investors. Although some of the SEZs have increased their areas, the limit on
such territorial expansion, which is determined by the legislation, has been
almost exhausted. 157 Moreover, in accordance with the 1994 legislation, the
SEZs are scheduled to cease existing by the end of 2017.158 So the important
question to consider now is what will happen after the year 2017? Will Poland
be ready to phase out the SEZs so soon? Is another decade enough time for
Poland to bring its standards of living and economic development to levels
comparable with that of its EU western counterparts? Or maybe the EU should
reconsider and allow Poland to extend the existence of SEZs for another
decade? After all, Poland still remains behind the western Member States in
terms of standards of living and economic development and it is quite unlikely
that it will be able to catch up with them within only ten or eleven years left of
the SEZs.

153Id.
154 Id.
155 id.

156 Inwestycje zagraniczne i transfer technologii: Co dalej ze specjalnymi strefami ekonomicznymi,

34-35 Dziennik Gospodarczy - Rynki Zagraniczne, March 22-23, 2005, available at
http://rynki.sm.pl/archiwum05/nr34_35.htm.
57Ministry Report, supranote 90, at 8.
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As noted by a number of commentators in this area, the EU never
really criticized the idea of SEZs themselves. 59 It simply did not approve of
the preferential treatment offered to investors in the SEZs because it considered
them to be incompatible with the acquis communautaire. After all, special
economic areas, similar to the SEZs in Poland, have, for some time now,
functioned in the territories of other EU Member States (i.e. Ireland and the
Portugal Island of Madera) and they were allowed because they were
Since the Polish SEZs
compatible with the acquis communautaire.1 6°
legislation has now been aligned with EU norms, nothing should stand in the
EU's way to allow Poland to create new SEZs after 2017 or extend the lifetime
of those already in existence.
The problem is that the SEZs legislation as it is now contains a clause
that permanently fixes the total allowable area of the SEZs. The 1994 SEZs
legislation did not contain a provision limiting the allowable coverage area of
the SEZs. 16 The provision came about in 2000 when certain changes were
being worked into the SEZs legislation as a result of Poland's application for
EU membership. The changes implemented in the SEZs legislation in 2000
allowed for: (1) the pre-mature closing down of the SEZs (meaning closing of
the SEZs before the end of the period for which they were originally created),
(2) the changing in the total area of the SEZs, and (3) the combining of two or
more SEZs under the condition that the total combined area of all SEZs did not
exceed the total area of the SEZs originally allowed.162 The reason why, during
that time, Poland agreed not to create any new SEZs is that the country was
hoping that the EU would approve the maintenance of the acquired rights for
the pre-2001 SEZs investors. 163 Poland did not succeed in sustaining the
acquired rights; however, the limit on the area of the SEZs to be created in the
future remained in effect. 164
This declaration, fixing the total area of the SEZs, also resulted from
the negative evaluation of the SEZs conducted by the Commission during the
years 1999-2000.165 This made sense because at that time the SEZs were still
governed by the 1994 legislation which was in conflict with the Community
rules regarding State aid.' 66 However, the SEZs rules were modified as of

159 Szymaniak, supra note 69, at 18. See also Ambroziak I, supra note 68, at 20.

160Szymaniak, supra note 69, at 18.
161Ambroziak I, supra note 68, at 19.
162Id.

163Ministry Report, supranote 90, at 9.
164id.
165Ambroziak I, supra note 68, at 20.
166Id.
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January 1, 2001 and from that date they were approved by the EU as compatible
with the acquis communautaire. 167 Any new concessions gained by the
investors would be governed by this new law and thus would be perfectly in
line with what the EU regarded as lawful. In light of such conclusions, it seems
that it would be more sensible for Poland to be able to create new SEZs. This is
one possible and feasible solution to the important problem of the country
catching up to its western member states in the EU.
After all, one main reason why the EU would like to do away with
SEZs is that the organization is trying to lower the levels of State aid offered by
individual Member States because it perceives such aid as destructive to the
unity of Common Market. However, we have to remember that not all types of
State aid threaten fair competition among the Member States. The EU has been
most critical of the sectoral aid but this type has proven to be declining in all
Member States. The aid offered in SEZs is not structural but rather regional aid
and this type is not so destructive to the maintenance of fair competition among
the EU Member States.
There is also another factor that speaks in favor of extending the
lifetime of the existing SEZs or the creation of new SEZs in Poland. It is the
idea that activity in the SEZs may in the long run assist with solving the
important dispute regarding the EU budget. Most recently the EU Member
States have shown to be in conflict regarding the budget funds that should be
granted to each Member States. This conflict is especially true in the newly
admitted Central and Eastern European Member due to their low GDP as
compared to their western counterparts. By helping to attract more investment
to countries like Poland through creation of SEZs, the EU will help Poland
repair its budget and by doing so will eventually decrease the amount of aid that
Poland may qualify for from the EU budget.
At first sight, the SEZs might seem to deprive Poland's budget of a
significant amount of revenue by granting the preferential tax breaks. However,
in the long run they will prove to be extremely beneficial to the country. Since
2001, any new investors in the SEZs are governed by the new SEZ legislation
that is compatible with EU law. This law imposes limits on the amount of tax
breaks that the government is allowed to grant to investors.168 Therefore, as the
businesses in the SEZs get stronger, they will eventually exceed those limits and
will no long be eligible for the tax breaks. When that happens, the investors'
tax rates will increase leading to an effective decrease in the amount of revenue
to the country's budget; this is exactly what is happening with the American

167
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168Ministry Report, supra note 90, at 4.
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169
investor, Delphi. Delphi is the world's largest producer of automotive parts.
It first appeared in Poland in 1998 when it decided to invest in the building of
the center of research and development in the Katowicka zone. 70 Currently the
center employs 560 Polish engineers who work on the development of the most
technologically advanced solutions for the world's biggest car producers.' 7' At
the beginning of October 2005, the company signed a contract with the Ministry
of Economy which granted it one million zloty (approx. $333,000) to assist with
the employment of an additional 260 workers.1 72 At the same time, the further
development of the Delphi research center will bring, in the next two73years,
almost five million zloty (approx. $1.6 million) to the country's budget.'

CONCLUSION
During the past decade, the Special Economic Zones constituted one of
the most important and controversial aspects of Poland's State aid structure.
Most recently the SEZs have been booming and the dynamic activity of
investors in the SEZs has been a crucial factor in the country's economic
development. The problem is that the Special Economic Zones have already
almost entirely run out of areas for new investors and most troubling they are
scheduled to cease to exist by the year 2017. At this point in time, it is hard to
imagine that ten years will be enough time for Poland to catch up with its EU
western counterparts in terms of standards of living and employment levels.
For that reason, it is crucial that the EU allows Poland to create new SEZs.
Extending the existence of Special Economic Zones will help not only
Poland but also the EU as a whole. If Poland's economic development
stagnates, it is likely that the economic gap existing between Poland and other
EU Member States will widen. As a result, Poland may qualify for more help
from the EU budget which is already overburdened. On the other hand, if
Poland is allowed to keep the SEZs or create new ones, it may further awaken
the economic activity in the country and accelerate its adjustment to EU levels.
Finally, it is important to point out that the future of Special Economic
Zones is not only dependant on the willingness of the EU to extend them
because Poland also has to work to ensure that the SEZs remain compatible
with EU goals. Most importantly, Poland has to ensure that, if allowed, new

169 Krzysztof

Fijalek, Rozbudowa Osrodka Badawczo-rozwojowego Delphi w Krakowie, GAZETA

WYBORCZA, Dec. 12, 2005.
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SEZs are created in those regions of the country that are truly the undeveloped
and poor regions. There has been some criticism emerging that the Special
Economic Zones are not really functioning in those parts of the country that
most need them but rather in those regions where the local governments have
the most political leverage. Accordingly, the Polish government has to ensure
that SEZs are created in those regions that need them the most and this can be
done by working on improving infrastructure and accessibility to those
undeveloped regions so that they can become more attractive to investors.
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TABLE 1 - State aid in EU by objective in 2003174
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TABLE 2 - State aid in Poland by objectives in 2001 and
2002'
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